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Abstract 
The questions that will be discussed in this paper are the 
following: Is it possible to identify capitalist classes, or a 
Chinese bourgeoisie (as a faceted mixture of diverse capitalist 
groups or classes) at the end of the 1990s? Are capitalist classes 
becoming an integral part of a "ruling class' or a collective body 
of 'ruling classes'? Is 'bureaucratic capitalism' a proper term of 
Chinese capitalism? 
This is an ambitious task: It involves complex and contested 
concepts, that of 'class', 'capitalist class' and 'ruling class' and it 
tries to relate them to a very complicated historical process 
actually taking place in the largest country in the world. How- 
ever, the questions involved are, or should be, of the greatest 
interest to the Chinese people and social scientists. In the paper 
I try to summarize some literature on the subject and to inter- 
pret some empirical findings from a class-theoretical perspec- 
tive in the hope of stimulating further studies and debates. 
The author argues that the actual modernization of the 
Chinese economy is producing new economic elites which will 
constitute a Chinese 'bourgeoisie' among which state and party 
cadres are in the lead. The specific state-led capitalism should 
be properly labelled 'bureaucratic capitalism'. 
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A Concept of 'Ruling Class' and 'Capitalist Class' 
A society's ruling class or its collective body of ruling classes 
may be defined in the intersection of three hierarchies: a hierar- 
chy of wealth (in the economy), a hierarchy of justification or 
legitimation (prestige and honour based on prevailing myths 
and ideologies) and the hierarchy of power (in the polity). The 
role and importance of these hierarchies may differ greatly 
from one society to another and also within a society during its 
history. 
A crucial differentiation of people in a society is determined 
according to their power to appropriate commodities and 
ownership or control of means of production and real estates. 
According to the kind of power, or power-base they possess, 
groups of people find their place in a societal class system. The 
conditions of appropriation in a society define and differentiate 
the class system of societies. 
In the tradition of Smith, Ricardo and Marx a capitalist class 
is defined by their members' interest in surplus-value produc- 
tion: the exploitation of labour in commodity production based 
on ownership or control over the means of production. We can 
thus define a class of people as a real or 'objective' position in 
the societal system of production, regardless of the class 
members' own awareness or consciousness about their position. 
If the inequalities between groups are understood as based on 
relations of production, interest conflicts will take the form of 
'class struggles'. Class is also a 'subjective' phenomenon, per- 
ceived by individuals who 'objectively' belong to the class. 
Classes begin to exist 'fur sich'. A class may be identified in its 
totality of objectivities and subjectivities. According to this defi- 
nition, not all social contradictions are class contradictions, as 
the Maoists of the Cultural Revolution perceived it. . 
We should have in mind that there is always, even in the 
most developed capitalist societies, a great variation of forms of 
ownership and control over the means of production, that 
forms are changing from one capitalist society to another, and 
over time. The crucial point in relation to class is the exercise of 
power to decide on production and the distribution of the value 
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of production, which includes the possibility of private expro- 
1 priation in one form or another. 
I As the conditions of appropriation change, the former 
economic privileged classes are going to be restructured or 
vanish. 'Nouveaux riches' will join them or replace them. The 
I suggestion here is that as the reform process is going on in 
China, the materially privileged classes will increasingly share 
, characteristics with their counterparts in Western capitalism.1 
I 
However, a Chinese 'bourgeoisie' should have its own charac- 
teristics, dependent on the specificities of historical traditions in 
, China: the character of the transition of the former regime and 
I the actual world-historical context. The world-historical context 
within which a Chinese 'bourgeoisie' will develop, has two 
main aspects: a continued globalization of marked capitalism 
and a world political regime where the United States plays a 
dominant role as the only superpower. 
It is not least important to underline the variation of forms 
when we are analysing a society like China. Since the end of the 
1970s China has been radically reformed based on a 
fundamental shift of paradigms of development. Especially in 
such a society we may expect a great variety of forms of 
ownership and power, new kinds of mixtures of old and new. 
'Bureaucratic Capitalism'? 
The ideal type of liberal capitalism is associated with a society 
where private wealth is the main resource of the ruling elites, 
with the state subordinated to the economy and with the rights 
of the individuals as the legitimating principle. 
In China, capitalism in its different forms and stages has 
usually been subordinated to the polity. During imperial rule, 
the state bureaucrats controlled merchant capitalism-the 
scholar-officials and the merchants formed two hostile but 
interdependent classes. The system may be characterized by the 
term 'bureaucratic capitalism' referring to the use of political 
power and official influence for private pecuniary gain through 
capitalist or quasi-capitalist methods of economic activity. 'The 
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golden age of the Chinese bourgeoisie', in the absence of a 
strong state at the beginning of the 20th century, was indeed 
brief. The Nationalist government from 1927-28 inaugurated a 
two-decade reign that is perhaps the archetyal case of bureau- 
cratic capitalism in modern world history. The communist 
victory of 1949 ended the Gournindang system of bureaucratic 
capitalism. 
The current Chinese political regime in transition has been 
given various labels: 'post-totalitarian': 'bureaucratic capital- 
ismf,4 'nomenclature capitalism', 'free-market communism', 
'capitalism with a Stalinist face', etc. In spite of differing labels, 
there seem to be a consensus that an industrial revolution is 
taking place and that this economic revolution has the character 
of capitalism. Maurice Meisner identifies four crucial elements 
that identify the growing Chinese mode of production: partial 
integration into the world capitalist economy; profit as the uni- 
versal criterion for economic activity; commodification of 
labour-power; and the creation of a new bourgeoisie. Still, the 
developments are in the early stages and during such a rapid 
social restructuring and transformation the pictures are multi- 
faceted and differentiated. 
The justification of these different stages in China's develop- 
ment have changed markedly. What about the justification 
nowadays? 
Changing Conditions of Appropriation in China 
The Role of the Party and the State 
A significant feature of the Chinese transition over the last 
decades has been the offensive initiative of the state. There has 
been no sign of state collapse. The economic reform has grown 
out of the central state plan.5 As Maurice Meisner has put it, 
'the coercion of the market is enforced by a repressive state 
apparatus, whose functioning includes the disciplining of the 
workforce and keeping social conflicts within bounds', which is 
the actual 'dictatorial and repressive character of the Chinese 
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state1.6 On the other hand, there has been a rolling back of the 
state as government expenditure fell from 41 per cent of 
national income in 1978 to 23 per cent in 1989. The continued 
central role of the state, however, is due to the influence of a 
modernizing elite consisting of state bureaucrats, managers and 
technocrats of state enterprises, many of whom were already in 
leading positions before 1978. The PRC's development since 
1978 has been a history of economic restructuring rather than a 
modernization, argues David S. G. Goodman? This could be 
related to the fact that the Chinese state has lacked institution- 
alization and therefore should be regarded as a political elite.8 
In the case of China a centralized communist state has 
provided the framework for industrialization and today it is 
this same Communist Party apparatus that provides the 
incubator for the capitalist revolution. The new rich emerge 
from the state itself in a process that blurs notions of public 
and private, state and market.9 
The Chinese bourgeoisie was eliminated by 1956. Therefore a 
class of capitalist entrepreneurs had to be created to permit a 
market economy to function. The state became the creator more 
than the instrument of the bourgeoisie. The dependence of the 
state, on the other hand, became reinforced by the eagerness of 
the most successful private businessmen to join the Communist 
Party, where the principal qualifications for membership now 
appear to be wealth and loyalty to the communist regime. 
Students who graduate from Chinese universities are also often 
eager to join the Party. The combination of advanced education, 
still a very scarce resource in China, and Party membership, is 
an entrance ticket to prosperity for youngsters. Today the 
number of Party members is higher than ever and the role of 
the Party has changed fundamentally. 
Privatization 
State ownership has been the bedrock of the communist regime 
in China. Privatization has therefore been a search for compro- 
mises between what is politically tolerable and what is econo- 
mically necessary. Instead of massive privatization, there have 
been proposals of measures transforming the state enterprises 
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into share-holding companies. These measures include the 
share-holding being organized on a so-called co-operative basis; 
the progressive withdrawal of the state; establishing holding 
companies as subsidiaries of the central industrial ministries; 
and the introduction of public share companies run by local 
municipal authorities, etc. Locally the processes have gone 
further. Even foreign capital has taken over Chinese state 
enterprises. The 15th Party Congress decided on an ownership 
reform legalizing the above-mentioned measures. One major 
task is to transform the state enterprises from societal organiza- 
tions into purely profit-making companies, thereby removing 
their character as socialist institutions. This represents a signi- 
ficant ideological break. In essence, the government's plan is 
gradually to divest itself of all but the 3,000 largest and most 
important state-owned enterprises. The smaller ones will be 
allowed to merge, go bankrupt, sell stakes to their employees, 
or, as is now increasingly common, be bought out by their 
management. 
Who is likely to take advantage of these developments? Some 
of the agents of change are more likely than others to streng- 
then their power and economic situation. These are suggested 
to be the managers in co-operation with Party-state decision- 
makers. Studies in Shenyang conclude that 
The most notable element in the reform of state industry is the 
progressive increase in managers' independence. . . . commer- 
cial enterprises are set up whose principal strength is to play 
on the duality of prices. The gongsi buys at the official price 
and sells at the market price: 'Profiting from this market on 
lack of goods, certain managers use their power in nearly all 
areas, from consumer goods to raw materials, from exporting 
rights to the trade in luxury cars. They operate both within 
and beyond China. All these people need in order to operate 
are name cards, a licence, a telephone and a bank account. In 
this way they make staggering profits.'lO 
The participants in state business have acquired their 'own' 
businesses in many different ways. We can talk about a process 
of spontaneous privatization. Small shareholders and workers 
are largely excluded from this process. The reforms in owner- 
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ship in Shanghai reveal that the Party has continued its control 
by personal arrangements that include assigning new titles to 
former bureaucrats who are then given a fresh opportunity in a 
corporate world. This lessens potential political resistance to 
any restructuring moves and allows the branch of the party- 
state to remain a major force in the governance of the new State 
Holding Corporations.11 
Clien telism 
While bonds of blood distinguished the interpersonal relations 
in feudal Europe, contract became the character of the relations 
between actors as markets developed. While familism was 
radically eroded by industrial capitalism in Europe, it has sur- 
vived in China until recent time. The institution of guanxi in 
China is supposed to have been much stronger than European 
familism. Fei Xiaotong has proposed a specific Chinese mode of 
association, namely the 'differential mode of association', 
founded on the guanxi.12 The system survived Maoism, and 
some argue that guanxi even increased during the Cultural 
Revolution. Today there is a discussion on whether guanxi will 
gve Chinese capitalism its distinctive stamp. 
A distinction has been drawn between guanxi practice as a 
'backdoor' system in conflict with the rational-legal system 
emerging at the state level (i.e. formal laws, policies and ratio- 
nal procedures) and guanxi more broadly conceived as a neces- 
sary part of the market reforms and business transactions in a 
market economy. Guanxi implies social relations, while guanxi 
practice implies the use of these social relationships to make 
exchanges, manufacture indebtedness, or accomplish tasks.13 
While Mayfair Yang's argument is that there has been a grow- 
ing importance of guanxi and guanxi practice in all types of com- 
mercial transactions during the economic transition in China,l4 
Guthrie questions such a conclusion. He bases his view on in- 
depth interviews in the urban industrial economy. He gives 
three explanations of his empirical findings. First, China is in 
the process of constructing a rational-legal system at the state 
level and formal rational bureaucracies at the firm level, and 
large organizations are monitored by the state much more 
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closely than are individual actors in the economy. Second, 
markets in China are becoming increasingly competitive, which 
means that there are very real economic incentives and con- 
straints against favouring social ties over the economic impera- 
tives of quality, price and the feasibility of a given project. In 
addition he argues that officials in China's transitional economy 
have no such control over the distribution of resources and 
products, and that an open market increasingly controls the 
flow of goods. Guthrie refers to the self-image of many Chinese 
managers who not only view guanxi as an important aspect of 
market economies, but who believe this to be true throughout 
the world rather than something particular to China. 
Anyway, guanxi is now often associated with corruption and 
something criminal because it was regarded as such during the 
Mao period when egalitarianism and purism were official 
norms. David L. Wank states that 
Patron-client ties are pervasive in the post-Mao economy 
between entrepreneurs operating firms and cadres staffing the 
state's administrative, distributive and production organs..15 
According to this author, the system is not of a transitory 
nature. It is not clear from Wank's discussion whether and to 
what degree the system he describes is peculiar to Chinese 
capitalism. Of course, in practical details, the system has its 
Chinese characteristics, however, it is unclear if it is designating 
a specific mode of capitalism. 
Margaret Pearson concludes her study on the new business 
elite with the remark: 'The pervasiveness of clientelism suggests 
strongly that the new business elite does not represent an 
emerging civil society.'l6 
There is no doubt that economic life is much more regulated by 
law today, compared with the situation 20 years ago. It is also 
relevant to argue that a legalistic culture runs much deeper than 
the simple construction of laws. However, it sounds a 
reasonable assumption that the growing economic structures 
comprising nationally and internationally operating businesses 
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should converge with the structures of Western and globalizing 
capitalism. 
The Opening Up to the Outside World 
As the delinking strategy of Maoism was abandoned from the 
beginning of the 1970s, the Chinese economy has consequently 
been integrated, formally and in real terms, into world capitalist 
regimes. The Chinese state has to relate to institutions like IMF, 
the World Bank and WTO. When the currency, the yuan, is 
made fully convertible, the laws of a capitalist world market 
will work as strong determinants in, the Chinese economy. 
Likewise, the daily operations by Chinese business on 
international markets and the joint ventures of Chinese and 
foreign capital, should change the conditions of appropriation 
and restructure the economic elites-what I now call the 
Chinese bourgeoisie-streamlining them to Western standards. 
From Ideology to Technocracy 
The Maoist idea that being red was more important than being 
expert, has been turned upside-down in the post-Mao era. The 
third echelon of party leadership, i.e. leaders recruited since the 
end of the 1980s, has produced few ideologists but an 
increasing number of men with higher and technocratic 
education. A technocratic mentality seems to have found its 
way into the leadership.17 However, Dengist slogans such as 
'Somebody has to be rich first' lend legitimacy to capitalist 
modes of appropriation. 
The Composition of a New Chinese Bourgeoisie 
A capitalist class is composed by different sub-classes or 
segments defined by the various sources of their capital, the 
different roles in the economy's division of labour (industrial 
production, trade, finance, etc.) and the amount of capital 
owned or controlled by them. According to wealth, power and 
status the capitalists may be described as a hierarchy. A much 
debated theoretical problem is how to define the boundaries of 
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classes. Another problem is the changing composition due to 
upward and downward mobility. 
Sources of private capital accumulation, applied to the 
Chinese situation, can be categorized as follows: misappropri- 
ation of state assets or confiscation of former collectively owned 
capital; foreign capital, investment and loans, joint ventures, 
Chinese management of foreign capital; household savings 
(sometimes used compulsorily to rescue state enterprises); 
direct exploitation through production of surplus value; trade; 
privatization of state enterprises (direct or indirect); commercial 
farming and landholding based on management of formerly 
collectively owned land (contracts); illegal (if laws exist) 
operations (mafia capital); state-owned capital, etc. Each of 
these sources of capital accumulation constitutes disparate class 
segments consisting of socially disparate people according to 
their social origin or capital: former imperial business families; 
party/state bureaucrats (including the military) and their fami- 
lies (nepotism); managers of state enterprises; younger people 
with higher education; compradors; private entrepreneurs 
(families) in industry, trade, transport, etc.; and peasants. The 
disparate genesis of these class segments represents potential 
differences in interests and outlook, both among themselves, 
and compared with capitalist classes in other societies. Different 
concepts have been proposed to describe the specificities of 
Chinese capitalism: 'cadre capitalists', 'nomenclature capitalists' 
and 'bureaucrat capitalists'. Meisner uses the concept 'nouveaux 
riches-an assortment of private entrepreneurs, compradors, 
managers, technicians, small industrialists, and profiteering 
bureaucrats' and 'an upper bourgeoisie'ls and refers to an 
estimated 10 million millionaires (in Chinese yuan) currently in 
China. 
A closer description of some of the potential important 
segments of a new bourgeoisie in China today include the 
following:19 
1. The rural petty bourgeoisie. This class became a result of the 
decollectivization of farming. It is a class made up of small 
landlords, commercial farmers, and small businessmen various- 
ly involved in commerce, in the operation of service companies, 
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and in village and township industrial enterprises. Communist 
Party cadres not only served as midwives for the birth of the 
new class but also make up (along with their relatives and 
friends) a substantial portion of its membership. As has been 
the general rule in the history of the People's Republic, this was 
clearly a case where economic power flowed directly from the 
possession of political power.20 
2. Technocrats:21 engineers, technicians, and high-level mechanics 
on the management level in formally state owned companies: 'Their 
relation to capital was not expressed in legalistic property terms 
- but, in fact, they controlled it exactly as if they owned it.'22 
'The children of the pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie formed the 
core of this "new class" of technocrats, along with selected 
representatives of the old proletariat.'23 
3. State and party high officials. These privileged groups of 
people formed social classes during the development of the 
People's Republic since 1949. Reproducing mechanisms were: 
nepotism; high education through elite schools; promotion 
through guanxi relations; arranged marriages. After the 14th 
Party Congress (1992) the Central Committee opened up for 
Party units and cadres to operate businesses. Earlier quite a 
number of officials formed quasi-governmental corporations 
that were in practice no different from state companies. Many 
have now set up private companies and joint ventures and 
joined the ranks of the private businessmen.24 
Some private capital is accumulated by misappropriation of 
state assets. Misappropriation includes the sale or concession of 
property for private use by the bureaucracy or the manage- 
ment, the theft of raw materials or machines, and an absence of 
records or undervaluations of the state property brought into 
joint enterprises with foreign companies. Misappropriation 
takes place on an enormous scale.25 
4. Individual entrepreneur households. At the time of the 14th 
Party Congress, China boasted of more than 14 million 'indivi- 
dual entrepreneur households', which provided employment 
for some 23 million workers. These individual businesses are 
controlled by bureaucrats and the Party through 'Self-employed 
Labourers Associations' and they constitute an important mate- 
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rial basis for bureaucrats through taxation. In the absence of 
formal institutionalization, the relations between the individual 
businesses and the local authorities (as tax bureaux) represent 
an area prone to power abuse and corruption.26 The 'individual 
entrepreneur households' and 'bazaarf-activities may escalate 
into larger-scale capital accumulation through financial trans- 
actions, Triad connections, mafia-like activities etc., as economic 
life gets out of political control. 
5. Private company owners. By 1992 there were 120,000 fully 
fledged private companies, which had more than 2 million 
employees. More than 11,000 of these private concerns were 
companies with limited liabilities, a jump of 72 per cent over 
the 1991 figure. The fixed assets of these private business units 
were mushrooming: the largest one had assets of RMB 45 
million.27 On this level of private activities we may talk about 
developed capitalism and real capitalists. The 14th Party 
Congress rescinded an order given in late 1989 which forbade 
individual and private entrepreneurs from becoming CCP 
members. By the end of 1992, there were nearly 2 million CCP 
affiliates who were either the bosses or higher employees of 
private enterprises.28 In 1982 the right to inherit private 
property was written into the Constitution. 
6. Compradors, These were in the beginning of the reform era 
offspring of high-level cadres who thanks to their influence in 
the bureaucracy, were able to arrange deals between foreign 
companies and state trading organizations. As Meisner com- 
ments, 'The lucrative "commissions" they earned in this com- 
pradore role was the first important source of substantial 
capital accumulation by private individuals in the history of the 
People's Republic.'29 The Chinese have also become agents of 
foreign capital investors with more or less autonomy to make 
decisions on behalf of the owners. The role as compradors has 
traditions that can be traced back to the first half of the 19th 
century in China. 
According to Hong Kong Economic Journal there are 303,000 
foreign-funded enterprises in mainland China: 
China has become the largest direct foreign capital importer 
among developing countries and the second largest direct 
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foreign capital importer in the world ... foreign capital has 
infiltrated each and every aspect of China's national economy 
and each and every region in China.30 
7. The military, through the building up of a military- 
industrial complex in China31-from military industry to civi- 
lian production-form an important sector of the state 
economy. As a result of the reform measures of the 1980s and 
the rush for profits in the 1990s, significant portions of Chinese 
defence production capacity have diversified into civilian 
production. This has been a question of survival. Even if the 
money-making production operations have been officially 
banned, the state resources are limited and not sufficient to let 
the huge military sector keep going. A revival of military profit- 
seeking activities is therefore likely.32 The PLA has also been 
the biggest political loser in the reform of the political system. It 
has lost its multifunctional role, being confined to a purely 
military one. On the other hand, the civilian political elites are 
dependent on the military for their future survival. In this 
context the question of a relative autonomy of a military elite, 
with professional military and profit-seeking interests, as a 
stratum of a new ruling class, is of critical imp0rtance.3~ 
8. Overseas Chinese, through family or clan relations within 
China. The amount of capital invested by overseas Chinese (of 
which there are 55 million in East and South-East-Asia) is 
considerable. 
Reorganization and Restructuring of 
Ruling Elites and Classes 
The question of dominant and/or ruling class(es) contains 
several degrees of complexity. In a society where the economy 
is marked by a tendency to commodify everything, capitalist 
classes are dominating economically. That means also sub- 
ordination of other classes, in other words 'the dull compulsion 
of economic relations'. This economic dominance is the main 
source-sometimes in indirect and complex ways-of a general 
social dominance; that is to say, the acquisition of social privi- 
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leges and the permeation of social life and institutions with a 
capitalist ethos, or the values of the capitalist class. It is also the 
source of a cultural dominance through the legal institutions, 
, 
the educational system and the mass media. But this general 
dominance is neither monolithic nor unchallenged. Social and 
cultural dominance does not flow automatically from economic 
power. Dominance needs to be maintained and assured by 
political power. The question is to what extent capitalists act as 
a collective actor. Collective actors are very complex entities. 
However, capitalists tend to operate more collectively than 
other classes. They are a minority with high degree of social 
and political interaction, through family connections, associ- 
ations deriving from distinctive educational experience, inter- 
locking directorates, business associations, pressure groups, 
and so on. On the other hand, actions may be confused and un- 
secured, and power is always limited. 
The success in maintaining a dominant position may be 
measured by the effects of actions on the social structure and 
the reproduction of social relations. One important effect may 
be the reproduction or increase of inequalities in the distri- 
bution of wealth and income. Looking to Western industri- 
alized societies, it seems clear, not least during the last decades, 
that the capitalist classes have been successful in this respect. 
From 1945 to the 1970s a generally rising standard of living, 
brought about by rapid economic growth, full employment and 
a great expansion of social services, reinforced the dominance 
of capitalist classes. Conversely, their dominance and their 
capacity to rule are threatened by economic recession, growing 
inequality, mass unemployment, increasing poverty and 
widening social divisions. 
What then are the attributes of the rising capitalist classes-of 
the new Chinese bourgeoisie-in building a position of class 
dominance? 
Relations to the State 
Because the classes aspiring to be a part of a Chinese bourgeoi- 
sie derive directly from Party- and state-led economic reform 
policies, they are thought to be backed by state and Party 
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power. The economic and political elites are possibly more 
intertwined in China than in most other societies. Meisner's 
argument is that 'the members of China's new bourgeoisie 
emerge more as agents of the state than as potential antago- 
I 
nists, providing the bureaucracy with an economic base and the 
communist state with a new social base.'34 A survey on 
investors in private business from 1993 revealed that: 
A considerable portion (1/3 of the urban sub-group, and 1/5 
of the rural sub-group) of these entrepreneurs were cadres or 
skilled technical personnel, a group that ranked among the 
highest both in income and prestige within the old system of a 
planned economy . . . Generally speaking, cadres-half 
government functionaries and half business managers-were 
at the core of the social networks of entrepreneurs in both 
cities and towns and rural areas. . . . a good relationship with 
the government was an important prerequisite for having a 
satisfying income.35 
However, the development has also demonstrated a significant 
upward mobility. Many former workers and peasants have 
been members of the new economic elites. The party delivers 
ideological legitimacy for the reforms and thus secures a heavy 
cultural influence among subordinate people. The very strong 
economic growth in BNP has not only favoured the capitalists, 
but also secured a substantial growth in living conditions of 
rapidly growing middle classes and more privileged workers of 
all kinds. As long as this development continues, the regime 
will have a basis of legitimacy. Another asset of the growing 
new upper classes is the integration of the Chinese economy in 
global capitalism. Huge international business corporations 
have vested interests in a socially stabilized China and will, if 
confronted with a huge and complex China in disarray, have 
powerful means to exert influence. Serious international econo- 
mic recessions may however weaken these avenues of 
influence. 
The concept of 'civil society' has been developed in the West to 
refer to state-autonomous social formations arising as signifi- 
cant aspects of liberal capitalism. The question is whether this 
dualism between state and society is a relevant concept of 
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understanding the Dengist era in China.36 Does the restruc- 
turing of the ruling class necessitate the growth of a civil society 
among the new economic upper classes, or will the Party take 
care of such needs?37 
There are several associations that are supposed to serve as 
conduits between the state and private enterprises. The most 
important among them seems to be the Self-Employed 
Labourers Association (SELA), which the government esta- 
blished for small-scale vendors and other small private business 
operators (getihu, up to seven employees; 1,800,000 members in 
1981, 21,500,000 in 1997); an association for somewhat larger 
proprietors, namely the Private Enterprises Association (siying, 
eight or more employed; 91,000 members in 1989, 430,000 in 
1997); and one for owners of the biggest businesses, viz. the All- 
China Federation of Industry & Commerce (ACIFIC) (340,000 
members in 1990,1,020,000 in 1996); and China's Foreign Sector 
Business Association (CAEFI) (15,000 enterprises as members 
1992).38 They are all supposed to serve as intermediaries be- 
tween the state and different levels of the private sector. The 
two first mentioned are, according to Unger, overwhelmingly 
dominated by the bureau that runs them, while the Federation 
of Industry & Commerce has been provided with sufficient 
'space' for it to serve as a genuine conduit between the state and 
a reinvigorated big-business sector. Related to the subject of this 
article, the two last-mentioned associations are of primary 
interest. The two others do organize a petty bourgeoisie (or 
non-elite capitalists) of a very different kind. Even if these 
classes are important in the development of capitalism, they are 
however secondary in an analysis of economic elites, even if 
they occasionally may serve as a recruitment ground for a 
business upper class. 
The question is whether associations like ACIFIC and CAEFI 
promote the interests of their members from a position of auto- 
nomy and whether they reflect the emergence of pluralism or 
civil society? 
The All-China Federation of Industry & Commerce was 
established in 1953 as the government's 'representative' organi- 
zation for the pre-revolution capitalists. In 1979 Deng Xiaoping 
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called in several former businessmen from prominent pre- 
revolution families and requested them to assist in the 
organization's rejuvenation.39 They helped to secure the Fede- 
ration financial independence. The Federation was initially 
associated with one of the so-called democratic parties, the 
China National Construction Association. By the end of 1992 
the Federation had enrolled 620,000 members, some individual, 
some enterprises. It also became a member of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference. One of the Fede- 
ration's prominent members, Rong Yiren, the scion of a major 
Shanghai capitalist dynasty, was elected in 1993 as a vice-presi- 
dent of the People's Republic of ChinaPo While state managers 
played a role in the beginning, the Federation has now become 
an association of state-independent private entrepreneurs with 
their own distinct interests. 
While the official role of the Federation is to serve as a 
'bridge' between state and private enterprises, there are several 
empirical indicators of an association moving from a 'state 
corporatist' role towards 'bottom-up' interest articulation. Like- 
wise, the mushrooming of chambers of commerce also seems to 
provide semi-autonomous arenas for the articulation of private 
capitalist interests. 
Pearson's analyses conclude that the state has tried to create 
channels of interaction between state and society 'to attempt to 
co-opt members of the business elite before they have a chance 
to engage in independent action on their own behalfI.41 
Even if there may be local variations, a general conclusion 
seems to be that among the three organizations SELA, the 
Private Enterprises Association and ACIFIC, only ACIFIC 
operates relatively independently from the state. It is possible 
that it aspires to represent a bottom-up initiated civil society. 
Paradoxically, the autonomy is required by involvement with 
the state and there are few signs of struggles for more 
independence. In a relatively insecure political situation, the 
private businesses are dependent on good relations with the 
state.42 
The survey on investors in private business concludes 'that 
relationships among entrepreneurs themselves were insigni- 
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ficant. The time is not yet ripe for them to form ideologies and 
organizations of their own? 
There seems to be a general tendency of nepotism in the 
recruitment of politicians in the post-Mao eraP4 Sons and 
daughters of leading officials also play a role among the new 
business elite. Clientelism is also important in the functioning 
of the capitalist sector of the economy. Margaret Pearson con- 
cludes her study as follows: 
[Tlhere is no compelling evidence that it [China's new 
business elite] has tried to influence government policy as an 
Gidependent class, or that there is even sufficient cohesiveness 
for it to do so. Rather, its members collude extensively, and for 
well-defined purposes, with officials, especially at the local 
level, in order to create better chances for success. In other 
words, clientelism is the major currency of interaction. For 
private entrepreneurs, ties with local cadres are absolutely 
necessary to their success.45 
A study of private business associations in China supports a 
hypothesis of integration between civil society and the state 
rather than competition and antagonism: 
It seems that in the Chinese context a civil society may not 
develop separate from and in opposition to the state but 
rather in the niches and spaces that the state leaves open, and 
that it will grow in response to opportunities deliberately 
engineered or accidentally created by the state. And, in turn, 
such a civil society may make demands upon the state - not to 
undermine or weaken it but to constrain its behaviour in some 
circumstances and to endorse and support it in others. Thus 
under the new economic conditions in China, a civil society 
and the party-state may develop in a symbiotic tension 
involving mutual exploitation and 
Pearson summarizes three concepts or models which have 
stimulated interest among students who have focused on 
state-society relations in post-Mao China: totalitarianism, 
pluralism and clientelist/state corporatism. She argues that a 
combination of a clientelist and a state corporatist approach 
provides the best framework for explaining the pattern of 
state-society relations in the reform period. The pluralist or 
democratization model, including the emergence of civil 
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society, she characterizes as 'merely wishful thinking . . . Instead 
of civil society, the dominant pattern consists of a combination 
of socialist corporatism and clientelism.'47 
A New Ruling Ideology? 
The new Chinese bourgeoisie still lacks a cohesive conscious- 
ness of their interests as a class. However, there exist ideo- 
logical elements that justify its existence. One crucial idea is 
Deng Xiaoping's slogan that 'some must get rich first', implying 
that this is the precondition for the welfare of the whole 
Chinese nation. Capitalism became officially legitimated by the 
Party Congress in 1992, when the hybrid concept of 'socialist 
market economy' was officially sanctioned. 
One scenario was put forward in 1990-91 by a group of 
Chinese communist 'princelings', including Chen Yuan, son of 
CCP patriarch Chen Yun, and Pan Yue, son-in-law of Politburo 
Standing Committee member Liu Huaqing. Conceding that tra- 
ditional Marxist-Leninist doctrines had lost much of their 
power to explain contemporary events and inspire the Chinese 
masses, China needed to adopt a 'neo-conservative' political 
programme, emphasizing not violent class struggle but harmo- 
nious Confucian social order and discipline; not communist 
egalitarianism but bureaucratic capitalism; not proletarian 
internationalism but ardent Chinese patriotism.48 After the 15th 
Party Congress in 1997, China Perspectives summed up the 
situation as follows: 
Behind a thin veneer of socialist ritual, the leadership is solely 
preoccupied with preserving a system that will ensure 
development, has the stability it requires and, at the same 
time, safeguards their privileges and status. This attitude, 
which one could label neo-conservative, leads them to reject 
any change to the political system. Yet at the same time, the 
new 'new class' knows full well that neither Marx nor Mao can 
be of any help in solving the economic problems which 
confront them. Jiang actually said as much in his report, 
quoting Deng: 'The task which we are undertaking is a new 
one. Marx said nothing about it . . . We have to find our way 
by trial and error.' In this respect the leadership is pragmatist 
through and through and quite willing to allow a certain kind 
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of capitalism to develop in China as long as it remains the 
principal beneficiary.@ 
This means that the ideological heritage from the totalitarian 
state no longer represents a menace to the rising capitalist 
classes. However, it does not mean that these new classes are 
developing an ideological consciousness. At this stage of trans- 
ition a pragmatic state utilitarianism should be what serves the 
new entrepreneurs best. Pearson also concludes her study along 
the same lines: '[Tlhe practical ideology of managers translates 
into a freedom not to be involved into politics and, concretely, 
an interest in avoiding politics so that they can focus on 
business .I50 
Changing Class Relations 
As ownership of capital is privatized, in many different modes, 
the relations between managers and employees are expected to 
change. Studies of the development of the Chinese communist 
work unit, the danwei, may tell us something about such 
changes. One such study is Corinna-Barbara Francis' study of 
Haidian District's high-tech sector.51 The danweis are deeply 
embedded in social, governmental and cultural practices and 
norms and will not vanish easily under new economic and 
political conditions. The study concludes that 
The lesser degree of state regulation over labour management 
in the non-state sector appeared to give managers in these 
firms even greater discretion and made the allocation of bene- 
fits in these firms even more hidden and nepotistic than in 
traditional work units. . . . This delegation [of state] responsi- 
bility to the enterprise further helps explain the continuation 
of paternalistic approaches to personnel management in non- 
state firms. 
What the study illustrates is the emergence of new relations 
between managers, labour and the state. The state may have an 
incentive to delegate the former danwei's responsibility to the 
private managers, and enable them to do so, as an instrument 
of control and regulation of the growing workforce in the 
private sector. Reproduction of the old system may in return 
strengthen the managers' bargaining position and complicate 
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the development of an autonomous labour organization. Per- 
haps here we can see the emergence of a specific Chinese way 
of managing the relation between capital and labour. 
Other reports deny such a development. Anita Chan con- 
cludes her study of a factory producing sports footwear for the 
Western market by assessing that 'the myth of the Confucian 
ideal of worker-management harmony has been overtaken by a 
model straight out of the military textbooks.'5* 
Conclusions 
The reform policies dramatically restructure the social system 
in China. New economic elites, based on a combination of state 
capital (expropriation of formerly collectively owned capital), 
state regulations and private capital, increasingly dependent on 
laws of capitalist markets, are taking the lead. Their raison d'2tre 
is a pragmatic revision of communist ideology and improved 
material living conditions of a majority of the Chinese people. 
The leading fractions of this elite seem still to be state cadres, 
with the Communist Party as their prime mover. Private 
entrepreneurs are for the time more or less a clientele of 'the 
nomenclature capitalists'; they do not yet form a social class and 
do not have a consistent ideology of their own. The private 
entrepreneurs could be defined as a social stratum rather than a 
mature, stable social class. 
The need for stronger social, economic and political organi- 
zations may in the future be a response to growing oppositions 
and consciousness among 'new' classes of exploited salaried 
employees. 
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industrial enterprises; freedom of the market; rational technology and 
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retention of paternalism as the core legitimating principle underlying 
authority structures generally and business organizations in particular.' 
S. G. Redding, 'The Distinct Nature of Chinese Capitalism'. The Pacific 
Review, 9 (3) (1996): 439. 
3. This concept is developed in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan in Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolid@ion, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996. This sets out the following characteristics: 'Plura- 
lism: Limited, but not responsible, social, economic, and institutional 
pluralism. Almost no political pluralism because party still formally has 
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